Kamala on the international stage

Vice President Kamala Harris has officially secured the Democratic presidential nomination, after the Democratic National Convention announced late Monday evening in DC that 99 percent of delegates voted for her.

ASPI experts provide their analysis below on how Harris, if elected president, would guide US foreign policy and how this would affect Australia. 

Overview—Justin Bassi, executive director 

For Australia, a Harris presidency likely offers continuity with nuance on foreign policy and security.  

A priority for Australia with any new president is ensuring they understand the importance of the Indo-Pacific region to America’s security and the value specifically of Australia as a partner. No other country is at once an American ally, a member of the two most significant minilateral partnerships—AUKUS and the Quad—and a close partner of other countries in the region, through for example its membership of the Pacific Islands Forum and its position as ASEAN’s first comprehensive strategic partner. 

The new president’s in-tray will be bursting with competing priorities across Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, with increasing disinformation and foreign interference online, and malign actors looking to sow dissent in democracies. Compared with the 2016 and 2020 elections, it may be harder this time to make the case that countering China in the Indo-Pacific is the predominant challenge. 

Harris would likely maintain consistency with the Biden foreign policy that has been set while she was Vice President. However, it will be important for Australia to identify and understand where there may be nuanced views between Harris and Biden as well as her likely foreign policy and security team, most probably different personnel to those around Biden. We’ve seen such a nuance on Israel—with Harris clearly putting a greater emphasis in public remarks on Palestinian civilian casualties.  

Australia will need to ensure that the necessary focus of the US on the two war-torn regions of Europe and the Middle East does not see a Harris presidency deprioritising the Indo-Pacific, and specifically competition with China, as the top priority for US foreign and security policy. 

Defence—Bec Shrimpton, director of defence strategy and national security 

Harris is likely to bring continuity on key defence policy and force posture issues with decisions guided by a traditionalist lens on the role of the US in global stability and its support for the rules-based international order.  

To date, Harris has appeared domestically focused, prioritising law and order, suggesting she will instinctively pursue foreign policy that similarly defends rules and international law. One question, however, with the US facing so many domestic challenges, is how much Harris thinks the US needs to be the ‘global enforcer’. Given the extent of global instability, she will undoubtedly face early tests on the US role in the world and her willingness to use American defence capabilities to intervene in global conflicts and disputes.  

Part of the question relates to the extent to which Harris sees strategic competition with China as the top US foreign and defence policy and whether she would be a president who diplomatically manages that competition or aims to win it. The indications are that Harris might begin as more of a manager. But the reality of the strategic environment may require her to actively pursue superiority as quickly as possible across a range of areas.  

Given her vice–presidential responsibilities, including as Chair of the National Space Council, Harris will understand better than most leaders the importance of space to the defence and economic prosperity of the US and its partners. Harris has, for instance, launched efforts to create a moratorium on the use of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that can destroy rivals’ space craft—demonstrating strong, normative leadership. 

Space is one area in which Australia can work closely with the US, aligning American interests with Australia’s comparative advantage in capabilities. 

US foreign policy and strategic vision—Greg Brown, DC senior analyst

With all his years in the Senate, Biden was a known quantity on foreign and security policy—a traditionalist who believed in alliances and a strong role for the US in the world. The striking thing about Harris, by contrast, is how little we have to go on. 

She was a district attorney and attorney–general in California; served a short stint in the US Senate; ran for president in 2019 but dropped out before primary voting began; and served as a loyal Biden team member and vice president. That raises the question whether the foreign policy positions she’s expressed simply reflect that loyalty, and whether she will assume new positions if she becomes president.

Her unusual pathway to the presidential candidacy means there’s been no adversarial primary process in which she’s had to defend her foreign policy positions against even friendly rivals. 

Over the past fortnight, Harris hasn’t been asked media questions or spoken about foreign and security policy. Key questions include: will she double down on support for Ukraine? Upend President Joe Biden’s support for Israel? Distance the US from Saudi Arabia? Revive the old Obama policies of reaching out to Iran?  

Above all, will she shift attention, time, and money away from international security issues to promote the domestic causes we know she cares about? Australians should be wondering: where does the Indo-Pacific region and its key theatres rank in Harris’s prioritisation list—and why? 

China—Bethany Allen, head of program for China investigations and analysis

While another Donald Trump presidency would likely bring greater unpredictability to the US-China relationship, Harris is likely to pursue a steady policy that, at least initially, is unlikely to veer sharply from Biden’s tough but measured approach. Though she has never visited China or Taiwan, Harris has criticised China’s human rights record, expressed support for Taiwan and has repeated Biden’s line that the US must ‘responsibly manage the competition’. Indeed on Taiwan, she’s declared that the US ‘will continue to support Taiwan’s self-defence, consistent with our longstanding policy’.

Harris has denounced Beijing’s efforts to wrest control of shoals in the South China Sea that are occupied by the Philippines and sit within its exclusive economic zone, calling those attempts ‘unlawful and irresponsible’ as she stood aboard a Philippines ship near the shoals.

She has also said that Trump ‘lost that trade war’, suggesting she approves of going head-to-head with China economically, but not in the same way Trump did.  

Harris is also likely to keep the interests of Chinese-Americans near the front of her mind. She represented California, a state with large Chinese diaspora communities, as a senator from 2017 to 2021 and before that served as the state’s attorney general. Chinese-Americans suffered from a rise in anti-Asian racism during the pandemic, fuelled in part by inflammatory political rhetoric.

Southeast Asia—Fitriani, senior analyst

Harris showed commitment to expanding US-Southeast Asia relations by attending the 2023 ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. Her attendance was meant to dispel doubts about US commitment to the region and to the centrality of ASEAN—given Biden had visited India and Vietnam but missed the biggest head-of-state meeting in the region. On the South China Sea, Harris made a show of support by travelling to the Philippines island of Palawan, which is next to the disputed waters, and emphasising that the US would support its partner in the face of intimidation and coercion.  

Critics noted that such travel would only aggravate China. However, Harris’s policy towards Southeast Asia, if she wins, is predicted by several analysts from the region to be a continuation of the Biden administration’s. That includes providing an unprecedented US$1.2 billion in economic, development and security assistance to the region and a further US$90 million funding for ASEAN.  

The US’s sustained commitment to Southeast Asia is appreciated by commentators in the Philippines and Vietnam—two countries where analysts have published favourable articles on Harris’ presidential nomination.  

That said, most senior members of the Southeast Asian political establishment are sitting on the fence regarding Harris’ nomination. A notable exception is the intervention of Indonesia’s former president Megawati—its first and only female leader—who openly endorsed Harris and sent her a support letter, wishing for another female world leader. 

India—Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow

There are plenty of divisions within the US foreign policy establishment—such as on Gaza and Ukraine. But on India, there is a general bipartisan support for closer relations, which is likely to continue in a Harris administration. That said, it is also likely to be a much more stable relationship than what we might see under the mercurial Donald Trump.

However, there is little indication to suggest that India would be a major focus of a Harris administration either. New Delhi itself appears to value its strategic autonomy more than closer relations with the US. There have been recent tensions related to alleged Indian covert operations targeting Sikh separatists in the US and other countries. The Indian foreign policy establishment is also somewhat wary of Harris’s possible focus on democracy and human rights in foreign policy, which has been another source of irritation in US-India relations.  

Nevertheless, Harris can be expected to work through these issues with India because the relationship is important to both countries given their common worry about China’s growing power and behavior. 

Climate—Mike Copage, head of the climate and security policy centre

On global clean energy tech and supply trends, a Harris administration is unlikely to depart much from Biden’s approach. 

If anything, Harris appears more ambitious on climate—having co-sponsored the Green New Deal in 2019 and pitched a carbon tax in her 2020 platform. While her near-term focus as president would be on implementing the Inflation Reduction Act, her administration could ramp up domestic climate spending as inflation cools further. This looks all the more likely because her position on trade (favouring American manufacturing in clean tech) is also consistent with Biden’s, though firmer on labour and environmental safeguards.  

Harris’ domestic energy policy positions, such as her proposed fracking ban in her 2020 platform, might be moderated to secure support in swing states that have significant oil and gas projects, such as Pennsylvania, but that’s unlikely to sway her foreign policy positions on climate.  

On international climate finance, her record and messaging on environmental justice suggest she could bring a strengthened focus on responding to the effects of climate change. During the COP28 talks, she announced the Biden administration’s US$3 billion additional investment in the Green Climate Fund. This was not received as a significant contribution, given the high adaptation costs and funding gaps facing developing countries. Though she has not adopted a clear position on enhancing climate finance, doing so would be consistent with her past positions and could inform her priorities as president—with implications for funding across climate-exposed developing countries, including in the Pacific.  

Engaging young voters—Marika Vigo, DC events and communications manager

Unless there is a strong turnout from young voters, Harris faces a narrow path to the 270 Electoral College votes needed to win.  

Within a day of Biden announcing his departure from the race and endorsement of Harris, the Harris for President campaign adopted a robust digital strategy to engage online communities of Gen Z voters. The @KamalaHQ account began posting topical memes, sharing news of endorsements and fundraising records, and promoting Harris’ policy record and priorities. She was depicted in stark contrast to Trump and vice-presidential candidate JD Vance through a series of clips of her archived speeches and committee hearings.  

If her campaign is successful with this strategy of engagement, there is a good chance that Gen Z voters will deliver Harris the presidency. In the 48 hour period following Biden’s announcement, daily voter registration increased 700 percent, with voters aged 18 to 34 accounting for 83 percent of those new registrations, according to the non-partisan Vote.org.  

And should this bloc of voters deliver Kamala the presidency, they will expect her to listen on issues they care about—climate change, gun violence, reproductive rights, LGBTQIA+ protections, the war in Gaza to name a few. 

To ensure a stable campaign transition, Harris will likely maintain Biden’s platform as much as possible, including on international issues. But if she wins, she may be open to hearing more diverse views, especially from young Americans on pressing topics such as support for Gaza. 

Harris’s necessarily restrained presence as vice president might prove an asset now as she gets the chance to build her own strong coalitions and carve out her own priorities, particularly on international affairs.

This article was published by The Strategist.