Enter the dragon

Kevin Rudd’s new book, “On Xi Jinping” offers insightful analysis of the transformation of Chinese politics, economics, and foreign policy under Xi Jinping’s leadership, highlighting the renewed role of ideology in shaping policy.

Under the leadership of Xi Jinping since 2012, much of Chinese politics, economics, and foreign policy has been turned on its head relative to the previous thirty-five years when China was led by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

According to Kevin Rudd in his new book, “On Xi Jinping,” Xi has embarked on an integrated ideological campaign of “Marxist Nationalism.” This means “taking Chinese politics to the Leninist left, Chinese economics to the Marxist left, and Chinese foreign policy to the nationalist right.”

Rudd’s book is the latest output of a personality with perhaps the highest international profile of any modern Australian. He is a former prime minister and former foreign minister of Australia. He is also former president of the New York-based Asia Society and the current Australian Ambassador to the United States.

While he was serving at the Asia Society, he completed a doctorate in politics at Oxford University. And this book’s underlying research is based on his doctoral dissertation titled “China’s New Marxist Nationalism—Defining Xi Jinping’s Ideological Worldview.”

Being based on academic research, it is not surprising that this book is a “harder read” than Rudd’s earlier works like “The Avoidable War.”  But for anyone interested in acquiring deep knowledge of China—something which is essential for understanding the modern world—it is worth the effort of ploughing through Rudd’s weighty tome.

Having sympathy for his readership, Rudd even suggests a sort of “cheats’ guide” to the book which is to read chapters one, three, and four, followed by chapters 14, 15, and 16.

Rudd insists that ideology has always mattered to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) —as an organising principle, a methodology for viewing reality, a belief structure, and vision for China and its role in the world.

Ideology is a significant but not exclusive determinant of downstream policy change and behaviour, which is often ignored by China analysts. Ideology also helps Chinese leaders appear as a “philosopher king” with enhanced legitimacy, rather than just being a tinpot dictator. The importance of ideology is reflected in the enormous amount of time that the CCP spends on ideology.

Deng saw that class struggle under Mao just made China poor and gave it the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, ideology took a back seat during the “reform and opening” period, from 1978 to 2013, as Deng, Jiang, and Hu emphasised pragmatism, including working within the US-led economic system. This led to a dramatic improvement in the economy, living standards, and national strength.

But when Xi assumed leadership of China, he saw many imbalances caused by reform and opening, which his predecessors had not addressed, according to Rudd. The role and importance of the CCP had been relegated. Xi has been working to restore the absolute centrality of the party and its leader.

Market-based reforms were corrupting the CCP and resulting in some entrepreneurs possibly becoming more powerful than Xi—hence the pivot of economic policy to the Marxist left. Greater self sufficiency also reduces China’s vulnerability to sanctions.

While Xi’s predecessors left the door of democracy slightly open, Xi could see the dangers for the CCP, and slammed it shut, writes Rudd. Xi also believed that China was sufficiently powerful that it could jettison Deng’s maxim that it should hide its strength and bide its time.

Thus, China is now “striving for achievement” through initiatives like the Belt & Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as challenging the US-led rules-based order.

Following the imbalances of the past, Xi is implementing a new type of reform and opening, according to Rudd. This has the state and state-owned enterprises at the centre. It emphasises state-directed industrial policy. This reform and opening is sceptical of the Chinese private sector, and role of the market.

Moreover, it is framed in a more adverse national security environment, and an increasingly binary contest with the US and its allies. Overall, Xi’s goal is to foster an all-powerful CCP, and prepare for national security contingencies of the future. Following the Mao and Deng eras, we are now in the Xi era of modern Chinese history.

While ideology has always been at the heart of the CCP, in a country where agency matters, Xi is particularly attached to the importance of ideology. Why? Rudd suggests that Xi was deeply traumatised by the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the dismemberment of the empire, and feared the same could happen to China.

The Soviet collapse may not have occurred if there were a strong and powerful Leninist state, with a coherent set of ideological beliefs. Another factor is that Xi is a “Second-Generation Red,” whose father, Xi Zhongxun, was a Chinese communist revolutionary. This means that his quest to retain the centrality of the Leninist party has a personal and familial dimension.

What does Rudd’s analysis of the resurgence of ideology in China suggest about future trends? Over the next 5-10 years, while Xi is most likely still leading China, the CCP will likely become even more Leninist, with less space for dissent.

There is no evidence of a reappraisal of the shift to the Marxist-left on the economy, so this will likely continue. But there will be tactical adjustments, like the recent monetary and fiscal stimulus in response to a weakening economy and youth unemployment.

On the external front, a hardening of relations with the US and the West is likely, though not involving ideological triumphalism on the Chinese side. Rudd sees Xi as a calculated-risk-taker. China’s reclamation of islands in the South China Sea was a well-calculated risk, as the US Obama administration did not respond. Any actions to invade Taiwan would involve a much higher risk venture.

If Xi retains his leadership position until well into his 80s, as both Mao and Deng did, Rudd speculates that Xi’s ideological changes might be well entrenched, and remain over the longer term. If for whatever reason Xi leaves the leadership earlier, Chinese policy may swing back to the centre.

Rudd cites a longer term pattern of “control followed by release.” But whatever the case, the West should remain open-minded about scenarios about China’s future and not demonise the Chinese people, culture or civilisation.

Understanding China’s policies and behaviour, and above all its motivations, is one of the great challenges facing policy makers, the business world, and international relations scholars and students.

Kevin Rudd’s new book offers very insightful analysis on Chinese politics, economics, and foreign policy under Xi Jinping’s leadership, focusing on the critical role of ideology. It is a very well written and organised book, and thankfully the author has suggested a short cut way of reading the book for busy people and those who may be less interested in all the detailed background documents and analysis.

This review of Kevin Rudd’s On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World (Oxford University Press) was published by The Australian Institute for International Affairs.