On the frontlines in Ukraine

In my role as an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), many people have asked me how we use drones and how they are influencing the current war.

I joined the Territorial Defence Forces of Ukraine in February 2022 on the first day of the Russian invasion as an infantry platoon commander and, for the last year and a half, I have been serving as the leader of an assault drones platoon in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. While drones were used in previous wars, I have seen personally how they have taken on a qualitatively different role in this one.

For example, DJI/Autel drones that were created for civilian purposes, such as filming weddings or beautiful mountain landscapes, are now being used as a reconnaissance tool. Before the war, relatively cheap, first-person view drones (FPVs) were made by thousands of hobbyists at home to practice their tricks outdoors.

Now these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become deadly weapons that have already destroyed hundreds of tanks and armoured vehicles, and killed thousands of soldiers on both sides. Agricultural drones, too, have become a weapon on our battlefield. Below I consider the significance of UAVs in this conflict and future wars.

First, UAVs can make a major contribution to Ukraine’s war effort in combination with other resources. Joint operations at the brigade level with artillery, infantry, reconnaissance/assault UAVs and thousands of soldiers involved are an approach that can dramatically change the course of war.

We have already seen some examples of such joint operations at the platoon and company levels, and the results are astounding. For example, the joint offensive operation of the 12th special forces brigade, “Azov,” in the forests of Kreminna using infantry, artillery, Recon UAVs and FPVs was a huge success, as was the defence by the K2 battalion of the 54th mechanised bridge in the north of Donbas.

In the first assault, orders were made based on the reconnaissance drones live-streaming battlefield footage. Such streaming also helped artillery and mortars to precisely shell enemy positions. Meanwhile, the pilots of FPV drones used the stream and joined the operation by hitting Russian positions with their kamikaze. As a result, the Russian infantry was overwhelmed by Ukrainian firepower and was eliminated without serious resistance.

In the second instance, a K2 battalion created a typical kill zone so the enemy forces could not advance for months- losing hundreds of personnel without any achievements, even at the tactical level. That became possible thanks to the joint defensive operation of reconnaissance and assault UAVs, artillery, and infantry.

From my personal experience near Avdiivka in October 2023, FPV drones with Recon UAV, mortars, and infantry gave us an opportunity to free a few hundred meters without huge casualties using the same tactics as Azov did in the forests of Kreminna. This approach requires the cohesion of the entire unit, detailed planning, and accurate timing.

So, the key to changing the course of the war is this kind of joint operation, and the question is which side will be the first to perform such operations at the brigade scale during offensive operations. Unfortunately, during the Ukrainian counteroffensive of summer 2023, our forces could not achieve this.

In part, this was because we didn’t have enough UAV capacity then. However, it was also in part because our generals believed that they could succeed using the old tactics of breakthrough with tanks and armoured vehicles. Indeed, the Russians made the same mistake in Avdiivka, except that unlike us they were ready to lose 20,000 soldiers and incur equally large losses of vehicles and equipment in exchange for minimal territorial gains.

Yet while UAVs are a game-changer, Ukraine’s experience shows that you can’t win the war relying solely on them. While some Ukrainian observers say that we will soon fight with robots, we are very far from having enough UAV and robotic systems to fight this war, which would require something like 100 times more FPVs and other UAVs.

This is a long-term development for the next few decades, not this war. In addition, current UAVs have several limitations, including that you cannot fly them into hollows because of interference with radio waves. Also, some of the systems, especially among FPVs, are new or were not invented for a war and hence are unreliable.

With these caveats, UAVS can be useful tools in asymmetrical warfare. For example, despite Ukraine’s lack of a large navy, our special forces recaptured the western Black Sea by destroying the Russian fleet with unmanned ships, allowing us to resume shipments of grain and other exports that Russia had been blockading. Such attacks are extremely cost-effective.

Whereas Russian ships can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, one unmanned boat costs only US$10,000 to $20,000. Our use of UAVs in destroying Russian petroleum storage depots and factories has achieved equally spectacular results. While both operations involving thousands of UAVs may cost us millions of dollars, the damage to Russian equipment can be measured in the billions.

UAVs have also become a foundation of management for any Ukrainian battalion because of their role in aerial reconnaissance: they show online what’s happening at the front line. Such visible reconnaissance can also be used to provoke the enemy into action. Thus, in my unit, we sometimes fly our UAVs over Russian forces. When this elicits a panicked response, we then destroy their equipment with mortars and kill the soldiers with UAVs (this is another example of a joint operation).

Reflecting their newfound military importance, drone teams themselves have become important targets for both sides in the war. On one occasion, I ordered two Mavic teams to search for Russian antennae and wires. Over two days, they found and destroyed two enemy UAV teams. The Russians also target our drone teams.

What does the future hold for this form of warfare? In the Russia-Ukraine war, there is an ongoing “invention race,” as both sides adapt to the successes of the other. Last autumn I was flying my FPVs with a regular hobby frequency, that is, a standard radio channel we use for transmitting commands from the controller in my hands and receiving video from the drone. But in January we were drowned out by Russian anti-UAV systems. Every month there are more and more such systems in the trenches, transmitting on the same frequencies, and thus causing us to lose control of our drones.

So, in February, we changed our UAV frequencies to a custom-made one. Thus, the rise of UAV warfare forces militaries to be nimble, as the advantage goes to the side that can adapt faster and rapidly scale up use of the invention throughout the whole army. With new types of UAVs developing every month, we cannot predict what the future of warfare will look like. However, now that UAVs have become a vital part of this conflict, it is already clear that war will never be the same.

This article was published by the Strategist.  It was edited with the assistance of Associate Professor Matthew Light at the Centre for Criminology & Sociolegal Studies and Centre for European & Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto.