Hang tough in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has now entered its eleventh year since Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, followed by Russian proxies waging a war against Kyiv in the Donbas until Russia’s large-scale invasion of February 2022. 

The war isn’t likely to end soon, and Russia is preparing for a long war. The arrival of North Korean soldiers on the frontline highlights the deepening military ties between Russia and North Korea and potentially China as Russia’s current strategic de facto economic, political, and military enabler.  

Almost daily, troubling reports emerge from the front: from Russian increased aerial bombardments of civilian hubs in Ukraine, execution of Ukrainian POWs, and Russian advances on Ukrainian territory, albeit slowly. In the West, a mix of “war fatigue” and strategic indecision seems to have taken hold.  

Peace through victory seems to be unlikely due to the asymmetry of military capabilities, manpower, and industrial war capabilities: Western and global (lethal and non-lethal) support stands at US$278 billion. The US, European Union, and Germany have committed most aid to Ukraine—with Australia’s lethal aid of AUD$1.3 billion remaining at the bottom of the donor list. This week’s announcement by our government to send 49 soon-to-be-replaced Abrams M1A1 tanks to Ukraine has to be welcomed and yet, this help comes probably too late.  

With no clear prospect of a rejuvenated and decisive Western drive to equip Ukraine for victory, nor decisiveness regarding the provision and/or use of long-range weapon systems, the long-term prospects for Ukraine look bleak. Even the continuation of support at current levels would not be enough to force Russia to withdraw its forces. In addition, the current war in the Middle East, with its effect on the wider region, has taken both resources and focus away from the war in Ukraine. 

Before this background of weakening Western support, ending the war through negotiations, with Ukraine making territorial concessions, has become a prospect which, unpopular as it is, is not off the cards. 

Volodymyr Zelensky’s “Victory Plan,” unrolled last week before Ukraine’s parliament does include NATO membership, “the lifting by allies of bans on long-range strikes with Western-supplied weapons deep into Russia and a refusal to trade Ukraine’s territories and sovereignty.”

President Zelensky’s points regarding Western support seems to be unrealistic given that the position of the West is either heterogenous, to put it mildly, or cautious. NATO made it clear in its statement of this year’s July NATO Summit that it will continue with its support of Ukraine but that an invitation to join NATO remains only a future option without any actual roadmap.   

It is reasonable to adopt a realistic and objective view of the war’s progression. The current situation has given rise to a partial defeatist attitude among some of Ukraine’s allies that is directly detrimental to Ukraine and the political West, regardless of the war’s outcome. Fundamentally, this stems from a (false) narrative that shifts the blame for the war and its duration away from Russia.

This narrative takes two main forms: one view holds that the West is escalating and/or prolonging the conflict by supporting Ukraine, while the opposite asserts that the West is complicit in the war’s development by not providing sufficient aid to Ukraine.

The latter often focuses on the quantity and quality of the lethal support as well as the limitations imposed on the use of weapon systems on Russian territory. Beyond the factual inaccuracies of both perspectives, they lay the foundation for a harmful future narrative. 

This narrative evokes a “stab-in-the-back” myth, not unlike the one that gained traction in Germany after the First World War. The myth revolves around the idea that the fighting forces are betrayed by those behind the frontlines, which in the German myth explained the nation’s defeat.

A similar sentiment could arise in war-torn Ukraine towards the West, even if a total Russian occupation does not ultimately occur, paralleling Germany’s post-World War I experience. In Germany’s case, the myth suggested that Jews, revolutionaries, and politicians had betrayed the army—an army that stood otherwise undefeated at the end of the Great War.  

Such narratives can fuel a similar legend of blame, in which the West and its policies are seen as partially responsible for the suffering that has occurred. Such a perspective can be adopted, regardless of whether one believes the West has provided too much or too little support.

This narrative poses a risk of gaining traction in Ukraine (particularly), potentially impacting on Ukraine’s democratic direction after the war, much like in Germany after the First World War. Should this happen, the narrative will inevitably be amplified by Russia. 

It is essential to remember that political disinformation is a crucial component of Russian hybrid warfare. From a disinformation standpoint, a myth like this could shift the blame for the war towards the West, and might unite both Ukraine and Russia against the West. This could lead to political forces in Ukraine turning towards Russia and away from the West.

While this does not necessarily imply an authoritarian future for Ukraine, if such a narrative takes hold, it could exacerbate internal divisions. The danger lies in this blame narrative gaining momentum, especially since it is has been promoted in the West. This lends the narrative greater credibility as it is not solely propagated by Russian voices.

Arguments blaming the West for the war should, for now, be attributed to partisan advocacy and/or naivety. Russia could point to the fact that the narrative of Western blame and betrayal has its origins in the West itself, thus claiming that it is not a Russian invention that the West is at fault. Ukraine’s allies appear to acknowledge it themselves.  

Therefore, the West, when advocating for a solution to end the conflict, must take extra care to counter any such false narratives as this would only benefit the true instigator of the war—Russia. 

This article was written by Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann and Håkan Gunneriusson, an Associate Professor in War studies and Researcher at the Risk and Crisis Centre at Mid Sweden University. He is also a former fellow of the NATO Defense College in Rome.

This article was published by the Australian Institute for International Affairs.