We must defend Taiwan

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) concluded joint military exercises around Taiwan from 23 to 24 May. This has the world on edge. Though large military drills are not uncommon, an increasingly tense Indo-Pacific has placed Western confidence in deterrence in a precarious position.

According to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) statements, these drills were to demonstrate ‘punishment’ for Taiwan’s recent ‘separatist’ activities following its 20 May inauguration of Democratic Progressive Party President Lai Ching-te. Other than China’s signalling its ability to blockade the island, the PLAN also demonstrated joint sea–air combat readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control and joint precision strikes, testing Taiwan’s military readiness. Chinese Coast Guard vessels also participated in ‘law-enforcement drills’ around the islands of Wuqiu and Dongyin — both located within the Taiwan Strait — for the first time.

Intensified official rhetoric accompanied the drills, including a statement by Chinese Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Wang Wenbin affirming that ‘those supporting Taiwan secession will get their heads bashed bloody’.

Since 1979, the US–Taiwan defence relationship has been nebulous. This ‘grey area’ within the US–China–Taiwan relationship has worked well, as earlier CCP administrations remained pacified within the status quo of the One China Policy. Despite US assurances that it will come to Taiwan’s defence in a conflict, the scope of US military involvement remains unclear. Many in Washington have unofficially termed this ‘strategic ambiguity’, though the United States has a legal basis to come to Taiwan’s aid via the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

The TRA stipulates the United States ‘maintains the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’. Though the United States ‘maintains the capacity’, it does not have a definite stance on Taiwan’s defence. Many have advocated for giving Taiwan clear US military guarantees in a conflict. But uncertainty remains, as the TRA does not explicitly stipulate a requirement for US defence.

Increased US clarity will serve deterrence in two ways: it will present a unified front, weakening China’s strategic messaging which is used to create doubt in the credibility of US–Taiwan defence (see President Xi’s recent comment to the EU that the US is ‘goading’ China into a conflict over Taiwan), and it will also force China to stand by its commitments to ‘never renounce the use of force’ in a Taiwan conflict, testing the CCP’s legitimacy.

This clarity does not come without a price — it will force policymakers to weigh the importance of defence commitments with Taiwan versus further raising the temperature of US–China relations. Yet this current delicate balance arguably preserves the US–China relationship only in the short-term, while weakening deterrence and emboldening Beijing’s normalising military action in the long term.

Clarity in official military alliance structures, such as NATO’s Article 5, is a stronger deterrent. Explicit wording is less manipulable by authoritarian governments’ messaging. Leaving room to interpret the TRA serves the CCP’s interests and helps the CCP manipulate public opinion as part of its ‘Three Warfares’ concept.

Increased clarity also places the onus on China. Rather than framing the debate around whether the United States will come to Taiwan’s aid, the question changes to whether the CCP is prepared to use force in the face of clear US assurances. This places the United States in a newly offensive position.

In an increasingly contested global order, foreign policy ambiguity does little to serve Western interests. Non-Western powers, such as China and Russia, seek to manipulate strategic ambiguity to its advantage — including placing it within its playbook of grey-zone operations. Ambiguity serves this threshold below warfare, allowing greater use of force where the line of defence remains undefined. The United States makes many efforts to bolster Taiwan’s defence, but must question the implications of strategic ambiguity. The TRA may not be enough to deter China in the long run.

As China conducts maritime aggression in contested waters under the threshold of conflict, ‘deterrence’ is further weakened. PLAN maritime activity around the Taiwan Strait has arguably become more normalised following the August 2022 visit of then US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi. The past two years have demonstrated intensified rhetoric and increased willingness to use force, coupled with a strengthened display of China’s intent to reform the world order. Xi Jinping does not appear deterred.

According to Xinhua, any Taiwanese attempts at independence will be met with a unilateral reaction by China. Beijing will adopt ‘salami slicing’ tactics — any move Taiwan makes towards nominal independence will result in a small but proportional response by China. This endangers deterrence — it allows military action with little consequence. While Washington focuses on an outright invasion, it is doing little to address gradual capitulation — which many believe has already begun.

US ambiguity leaves little clarity for Taiwan, increases pressure on US allies to pick a side and does little to deter adversaries. The onus shifts from stopping China’s actions to a US decision on whether any action is enough to defend Taiwan militarily. This allows the CCP to exercise its own concepts of ‘deterrence’ through increased aggression across the diplomatic, informational, military and economic spectrum.

The upcoming 2024 US elections provide ample opportunity to clarify US messaging in the Asia-Pacific. This becomes especially important as the United States faces domestic delays in weapons procurement to bolster the island’s defences.

It is time for the United States to get clear on Taiwan — and redefine what it means by deterrence during what some call a ‘new Cold War’.

This article was published by The East Asia Forum.